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CERTIFICATION: ASSURING THE PRIMACY OF STATE
LAW IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JomN D. BUTZNER, JR.*
MARY NASH KELLY**
In 1938 the Supreme Court held that federal courts in diversity cases
must follow the substantive law of the state whose laws govern the case,
"whether ... declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision ....." In cases in which the state's law is not clear, the federal
court must predict what the highest court of the state would decide if faced
with the question. 2 If a federal court is mistaken, the result can harm one
of the parties and confuse future litigants.'
Apart from the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, the best solution to
the federal courts' difficulty in predicting uncertain state law is certification. 4
This procedure enables a federal court to send a specific, unresolved question
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
** B.A., Wake Forest Univ., 1980; J.D., Univ. of Va., 1984.
1. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GEERAL. VIEw 142-43 (1973); Note, The
Uniform Certification of Questions ofLaw Act, 55 IowA L. REv. 465, 466-69 (1969) (hereinafter
Note, Uniform Act).
3. For example, in Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., the Fourth Circuit decided that the
Virginia long arm statute required more than a single act to give the court jurisdiction and
affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. See Haynes v. James Carr, Inc., 427
F.2d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 1970). Less than a year later, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
Virginia long arm statute was a single act statute "requiring only one transaction in Virginia to
confer jurisdiction on its courts." Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromoderm, Inc., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180
S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971). Thus the plaintiffs in Haynes were deprived of a forum by an incorrect
prediction of Virginia law. See also Note, The Case for Certification, 12 WM. & MAlY L. REv.
627, 642 nn. 93-98 (1971).
4. Federal courts can avoid the problem in narrowly limited circumstances by abstention.
See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-821
(1976); see also 17 W~iuOT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION §§ 4241-4247 (1978) (hereinafter 17 WIGn'r & MILLER).
Abstention, however, raises a number of problems, especially the necessity for litigation
through the state court system with the concomitant delay and expense. See Note, Inter-
jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 344, 346-48 (1963) (hereinafter Note, Inter-jurisdictional Certification); Note,
Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE DAlME
L. REv. 1339, 1339-48 (1984).
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of state law to the highest court of the state whose law is controlling. It was
used first in 1960 after the United States Supreme Court expressed its
approval5 of a Florida statute providing for certification. 6 In 1967 the
American Bar Association approved a proposal for a Uniform Certification
of Questions of Law Act drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.7 Since then, the procedure has received
increasing acceptance and praise from courts and commentators:
[Certification] prevent[s] federal invasion of the state law-making
function and ... avoid[s] needless federal-state friction-but also
represents a more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism,
since concern for state sovereignty is implemented through a more
efficient and simpler proceeding [than abstention].'
Furthermore, the procedure increases the quality of judicial decision-making
because certification results in a clear answer to a state law question that is
binding on the parties, receives full faith and credit in the federal court, and
creates a correct precedent for future litigants.9
Thirteen years after the Supreme Court approved the procedure, it
endorsed certification even more strongly. Justice Douglas, who initially had
spoken out against certification,' 0 wrote for a unanimous court in Lehman
Bros. v. Schein:m " "[Tihe certification procedure ... does, of course, in the
long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism....,, 2
There are now thirty-one jurisdictions that have a statute or rule
allowing certification. 13 The Uniform Act, which has been adopted by a
5. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Justice Frankfurter wrote for the
Court: "The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of authorita-
tively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits
a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida
for its decision." Id. at 212. See also Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 739-43 (Fla.
1961) (decision of certified question).
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1957).
7. UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967) (hereinafter
UNIFORM ACT).
8. Note, Inter-jurisdictional Certification, supra note 4, at 350. See also Note, Civil
Procedure-Scope of Certification in Diversity Jurisdiction, 29 RtrrGERS L. Rav. 1155, 1156
nn. 11, 13 (1976).
9. Lillich and Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 888, 906-08 (1971); see also Note, The Case for Certification, supra note 3,
at 641-45; Note, Uniform Act, supra note 2, at 470-74.
10. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
12. Id. at 390-91; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), in which the Court
directed the district court on remand to certify a question of state statutory interpretation to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, noting that "the importance of speed in resolution
of the instant litigation is manifest.... [Tihe availability of certification greatly simplifies the
analysis." Id. at 151.
13. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 4248 n. 29 (1978 & Supp. 1984); see also Note,
Giving Deference to State Law: New South Dakota Certification Statutes Enable Federal Courts
to Defer to Supreme Court, 30 S.D.L. REv. 180, 181 n.9 (1984). These lists do not include South
Carolina, which adopted certification by Supreme Court rule in 1982. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46.
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majority of the states that have a certification procedure, 14 gives the highest
court of the state the discretionary authority to answer questions certified to
it. 15
The Uniform Act allows certification only if there is no controlling
precedent that would govern the case.' 6 When a federal court decides to
certify a question, 7 it sets forth a certification order containing the question
of law and a statement of the nature of the controversy and the facts
necessary to the disposition of the case. 8 In some courts, including the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the parties participate in preparing the
submission to the state court. 9 The cases are then briefed and argued before
the state court, as provided by local rule. 20
The state court may request the complete record, 2' or it may restate the
question in order to provide a complete state law answer. 22 The state court
simply may refuse to answer the question if the certifying court has not
provided sufficient facts for a decision. 23 Also, refusal is appropriate when
the state court concludes that its construction of state law would not be
dispositive of a controverted issue. 24 These procedural safeguards preclude
requests for advisory opinions and assure the state court that it is asked to
decide only controverted legal issues arising from facts that the certifying
court has determined conclusively.
14. Compare Table of Jurisdictions, UiNo,. ACT, supra note 7, at 17 with WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 4, § 4248 n. 29.
15. The uniform statute and most state statutes allow certification from both federal
courts and appellate courts of other states. UmroRm ACT, supra note 7, § 1.
16. Id. § 8. This restriction is designed in part to prevent federal courts from certifying
state court questions merely because they are difficult. See 17 WRIGr & MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 4248.
17. Certification may be invoked by the court, or it may be sought by any party. UNIFoRM
ACT, supra note 7, § 2.
18. Id. §§ 3-4.
19. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 578 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1978); H.S.
Equities v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 512 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. See, e.g., MD. SuP. CT. R. 896, 830; S. C. SUP. CT. R. 46, § 6.
21. Uinfom ACT, supra note 7, § 5. See Note, Florida's Inter-jurisdictional Certification:
A Reexamination to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 21, 30-32 (1969).
22. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 4248 nn. 57, 58.
23. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966), in which the court held that it would
only answer certified questions if "all material facts have been either agreed upon or found by
the [certifying] court," and sent the case back to the federal court for fact-finding. Id. at 833.
24. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to decide a certified
question because it believed federal law was controlling regardless of its decision of the state
law question. Abrams v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 263 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1980). Some
courts will answer a certified question only if the state law answer will settle the entire case,
but commentators have pointed out that this narrow interpretation renders the procedure
virtually useless. Most courts will answer the question if at least one resolution of the question
could dispose of the case. See Note, Case for Certification, supra note 3, at 627-28; American
Law Institute, Study of The Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts 283,
295-96 (1965).
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has rejected the contention that
certification calls for advisory opinions.25 The court pointed out that the
parties are before the court and the court's decision has "the force of decided
case law within the courts of this state, and constitutes res adjudicata as
between the same parties .... 26 Erie makes the answers to certified questions
"conclusive and determinative in the federal courts with respect to the state
of the law in [that state]."27
Concern that certification will engender undue delay has proved to be
unfounded. 28 Experience suggests that any delay caused by certification is
outweighed by its benefits. In 1983 the Federal Judicial Center conducted a
study of the experience of federal courts that had used certification. 29 The
Center surveyed federal judges who had participated in a sample group of
forty-nine cases in which certified questions had been answered, asking them
whether they believed certification had been effective and what its advantages
and disadvantages were. 30 . The study found that the procedure received
overall positive ratings from the judges.3' They indicated that while the
procedure may delay a final decision, that disadvantage is outweighed by the
advantage of having an authoritative answer from an appropriate tribunal,
which reduces future litigation and improves relations between state and
federal courts.
3 2
State court judges have also expressed satisfaction with the procedure.
Justice Sidney W. Wernick of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine told the
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference in 1976 that "I come as a salesman.... I
am an unabashed enthusiast of the certification procedure. ' 33 Commentators
and jurists have praised certification because it improves interjurisdictional
relations and reinforces the sovereignty of state courts. 34 In addition, statistics
show that state courts have not been inundated with the flood of cases that
25. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d at 829-32.
26. Id. at 832.
27. Id. at 832; see Lillich and Mundy, supra note 9, at 904 n. 106, pointing out that the
state court at least implicitly has jurisdiction over the parties to the case before it; see also In
re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (1968), in which the court stated that its opinion
would not be advisory because it was binding on the parties as res judicata and constituted
binding state precedent. Id. at -, 446 P.2d at 354.
28. For example, in Justice Douglas's dissent in Clay, he argued against certification
because of the delay and expense involved. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 227-28,
(1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas subsequently changed his mind and spoke in
favor of certification in 1973. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper, Certifying Questions of State Law: Experience
of Federal Judges (January 1983) (hereinafter FJC Study).
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id. at v.
32. Id. at 10-11.
33. Speech by Justice Sidney W. Wernick, Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference (June 29,
1976).




some critics suggested would follow certification. 5 While certification carries
with it the potential for abuse, the existence of discretion at both ends of
the procedure helps to reduce that risk. As one commentator wrote: "There
is good reason to suppose that federal and state court judges are sensitive to
the burdens that can be placed upon either by an injudicious use of the
procedure."36
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted policies and
procedures to avoid the pitfalls of certification. The court will not certify a
question to a state court "unless and until it appears that the answer is
dispositive of the litigation or is a necessary and inescapable ruling in the
course of the litigation." 37 The court has pointed out that "federal courts
should take care not to burden their state counterparts with unnecessary
certification requests." ' 38 It has refused to certify cases where the state law
issue is not dispositive or where there is existing controlling precedent.
39
Maryland was the first among the five states in the Fourth Circuit to
pass a certification statute and has the most experience using it. 40 The
Maryland Court of Appeals has answered questions from several courts
covering a wide range of Maryland law, generally involving subjects that
traditionally are the province of the states. Thus, issues involving statutes of
limitations, 41 products liability,42 punitive damages, 43 public policy ques-
tions,44 and construction of wills45 have been certified to the Maryland court.
West Virginia passed its certification statute in 1976.4 All four of the
35. Note, Case for Certification, supra note 3, at 640; Note, Reexamination to Promote
National Use, supra note 21, at 30.
36. Lillich and Mundy, supra note 9, at 910; see also FJC Study, supra note 29, at 9-10.
37. Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981).
38. Id. at 1385 n. 5.
39. See, e.g., Pyne v. Hartman Paving, Inc., No. 83-1443; (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1984); Smith
v. FCX, Inc., 83-1993 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1984). Despite the care that it has exercised, the court
improvidently certified one case to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See Flannery
v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983).
40. MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to 12-609 (1972). Since 1972, at least
16 cases with published opinions have been certified to the Maryland Supreme Court: 11 from
federal district courts, 4 from the federal courts of appeal, and 1 from the United States
Supreme Court. See infra notes 41-45.
41. Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 578 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1978); Walko Corp.
v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc, 554 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Chertkof v. Mayor of Baltimore,
497 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1980); Yarmouth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256,
407 A.2d 315 (1979); Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 397 A.2d 1009 (1979); Guy v. Director,
Patuxent Instit., 279 Md. 69, 367 A.2d 946 (1977).
42. Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
43. Smith v. Gray Concrete Piping Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
44. Food Fair Stores v. Joy, 283 Md. 205, 389 A.2d 874 (1978).
45. Bryan v. United States, 286 Md. 176, 406 A.2d 423 (1979); Mercantile Safe Deposit
Co. v. Purifoy, 273 Md. 58, 327 A.2d 483 (1974) and 280 Md. 46, 371 A.2d 650 (1977).
46. W. VA. CODE §§ 51-IA-1 to 51-IA-12 (1976).
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published cases in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
answered certified questions dealt with questions of tort law and damages
under West Virginia law.4-
In South Carolina, the Supreme Court adopted a rule in 1982 authorizing
certification.4 Since then, the South Carolina Supreme Court has answered
seven certified questions, nearly all of which dealt with South Carolina
insurance statutes, products liability, and other tort law questions.
49
Virginia, understandably, has not been quick to join the growing number
of states with certification procedures. Until the creation of the Court of
Appeals of Virginia,50 Virginia was the only state in the nation with a
population greater than three million in which the Supreme Court carried
the entire burden of appellate review.-" The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has expressed its view that certification would be beneficial because
unresolved questions of Virginia law arising in federal cases could be decided
definitively. 2 Perhaps the new intermediate appellate court will relieve the
Supreme Court of enough of its heavy caseload to make certification feasible.
The Virginia Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
"in cases of habeas corpus, mandamus and prohibition.... All other juris-
diction of the Supreme Court shall be appellate. ' 53 Subject to those limita-
tions, the General Assembly has the power "to determine the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth. 5 4 It would seem,
therefore, that the General Assembly constitutionally could allow the Virginia
Supreme Court to accept certified cases that are appellate in nature. This
restriction would require certification to be limited to questions from appel-
late courts.
47. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982); Sitzes v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch, 288 S.E.2d 511 (X.
Va. 1982); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
48. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46.
49. Dixon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., - S.C. -, 316 S.E.2d 376 (1984); Hupman
v. Erskine College, - S.C. -, 314 S.E.2d 314 (1984); Hill v. BASF-Wyandotte Co., 280
S.C. 734, 311 S.E.2d 734 (1984); Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723
(1984); Gambrell v. Travellers Ins., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983); Southeastern Freight
Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 279 S.C. 174, 303 S.E.2d 860 (1983); Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co.,
278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983).
50. VA. CODE §§ 17-116.01 to .14 (1983).
51. The thirteen states that do not have intermediate appellate courts have populations
that are considerably smaller than that of Virginia (5,491,000). The states are: Delaware
(602,000), Mississippi (2,551,000), Montana (801,000), Nebraska (1,586,000), Nevada (881,000),
New Hampshire (951,000), North Dakota (670,000), Rhode Island (958,000), South Dakota
(691,000), Utah (1,554,000), Vermont (516,000), West Virginia (1,948,000), and Wyoming
(502,000). Population figures were taken from Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 11 (104th ed. 1984).
52. Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agcy., Inc., 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978).




The New York State Law Review Commission has sent a proposal to
the New York legislature recommending certification only from appellate
courts because the appellate court can "use the lower court's opinion to
determine more accurately whether there is no controlling state law; to make
certain that the question is necessary to the disposition of the case; and to
assist the formulation of the question to be certified. ' ' 5  Several other states
allow certification only from appellate courts in order to limit the number
of certified cases and to avoid any problems with the fact finding aspects of
the cases.5
6
It is likely that limiting certification to appellate courts would add only
a small number of cases to the Virginia Supreme Court's docket. For
example, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has certified less than
a half-dozen cases since 1972 out of approximately 23,000 cases filed during
that time.
7
Certification has many advantages, but undoubtedly its greatest virtue is
the enhancement of the quality of justice.58 Virginia citizens whose rights
depend on authoritative interpretation of the law of the Commonwealth will
be beneficiaries of certification.
55. Memorandum of the New York State Law Review Commission to the 1984 Legislature,
Leg. Doc. (1984) No. 65[B], at 11-12 (1984) (hereinafter cited as New York Memorandum). See
Note, Inter-jurisdictional Certification, supra note 4, at 360-61.
56. See, e.g., New York Memorandum, supra note 55, at 12. Wisconsin, Florida, Hawaii,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and Mississippi do not allow certification from federal district
courts. See Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
25.031 (West 1974); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 602-5(2) (1976) in conjunction with HAWAll S. CT.
R. 20; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-0(a) (1982) in conjunction with GA. S. CT. R. 36; IND. CODE
ANN. § 33-2-1-3 (Burns 1985) in conjunction with IND. S. CT. R. 15(o); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:72-1 (West 1983) in conjunction with LA. S. CT. R. 12; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-39 (1972)
in conjunction with Miss. S. CT. R. 46; see also Comment, Abstention and Certification in
Diversity Suits: Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals, 73 YALE L. J. 850 (1964).
57. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Court Management Statistics,
Table-Fourth Circuit (1984, 1979, and 1974). The estimate of the number of cases certified by
the Court of Appeals was derived from published cases disclosed in an electronic search. The
clerk recently has begun to keep a list of cases involving certified questions.
58. In Green v. American Tobacco Co., Judge Rives wrote:
First, to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida we wish to express publicly
and with deep sincerity our appreciation for their answer to the question which we
certified to that Court.... That answer has saved this Court, through the writer as its
organ, from committing a serious error as to the law of Florida which might have
resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court of Florida has been a
very real help in the administration of justice.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Note, Case for
Certification, supra note 3, at 643 n. 101.
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